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1Efficient Secure AC OPF for Network Generation
Capacity Assessment
C.J. Dent, Member, IEEE, L.F. Ochoa, Member, IEEE, G.P. Harrison, Member, IEEE,
and J.W. Bialek, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—This paper presents a novel method for determining
the capacity of a network to accommodate new generation under
network security constraints. The assessment is performed by
maximising the total generation capacity in an optimal power
flow model; this is solved by gradually adding limited numbers
of line outage contingencies, until a solution to the complete
problem is obtained. The limit on the number of contingencies
added is key to the method’s efficiency, as it reduces the size
of the optimisation problems encountered. Moreover, varying
this limit on contingencies added provides a simple and highly
efficient means of searching for multiple local optima of the
nonlinear optimisation problem. The method has been tested
on a modified version of the highly-meshed IEEE Reliability
Test System with N–1 security, where a significant reduction in
the system’s capacity for new generation is seen when security
constraints are imposed. The method is generic and may be
applied at any voltage level, for other security models, and
for other similarly-structured problems such as the analysis of
multiple resource availability scenarios.
Index Terms—Optimization methods, Load flow analysis,
Power generation planning.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the current drive towards renewable and otherlow-carbon generation, the geographical pattern of
generator locations is changing. As a result, there is now
significant penetration of generation in parts of the network,
particularly the distribution network, where formerly there was
mainly load. A range of technical impacts (e.g. voltage rise,
reverse power flows) dictate the amount of generation that
may be connected without resort to network reinforcement. To
maximise the potential of a network to support such distributed
generation it is important that these factors are carefully
assessed, as poorly placed generation can significantly reduce
the total potential for connecting generation [1]. Effective and
efficient methods of assessing the capacity of the network to
accommodate generation are therefore important, and there
is a need to incorporate as many of the relevant technical
constraints as possible, including security considerations.
Several authors have proposed mathematical optimisation-
based approaches to network-wide planning of generation ca-
pacity and location, as opposed to considering one generation
site at a time. These have included a linear programming
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model to determine the optimal allocation of generation [2],
tabu search in a loss minimisation problem [3], and the use of
a genetic algorithm to solve a multi-objective problem consid-
ering losses, costs and power generated [4]. In addition, earlier
work involving two of the present authors has demonstrated
the use of an AC optimal power flow (OPF) model to assess a
network’s capacity to accommodate generation [1], [5]. That
framework forms the basis for this work.
The OPF was originally developed in the 1960s for network-
constrained economic dispatch, and has since been applied
to many other problems [6], [7]. Its use in assessing the
capacity of networks for connecting generation differs from
the economic dispatch OPF both in the objective function
(maximum network generation capacity, as opposed to mini-
mum operating cost) and the decision variables (the capacity
of potential generators, as opposed to the output of fixed-
capacity generators). Additionally, for economic dispatch the
fixed demand limits the degree of network congestion. Here,
the maximisation of capacity, with surplus generation above
the local demand being exported to an external grid, brings
about greater levels of congestion; in a sense, the question is
‘how hard can the network be run?’
All transmission networks and many distribution networks
are designed to operate in a secure mode to ensure continuity
of supply under an outage (or contingency) of a circuit (N-
1 security), or in some cases any two circuits (N-2). The
constraints imposed by secure operation reduce the transfer
capacity of the network, and specialised approaches have been
developed to solve the resulting large Security-Constrained
OPF models (SCOPF). One common option is to pre-select a
limited number of outage contingencies which are likely to be
significant [6]. An alternative approach, which allows efficient
consideration of all contingencies, is to build a solution to the
full problem by solving a series of subproblems, in which
appropriate combinations of contingencies are added at each
iteration [8].
This paper presents a new efficient solution method for
OPF models used to assess network generation capacity
under security constraints. The method is demonstrated on a
modified version of the meshed IEEE 73 bus Reliability Test
System (RTS) [9] with N–1 security, in which new generators
are given firm connections. The method is however generic,
and may be applied at any voltage level, for other security
models, and for other similarly-structured problems such as
the analysis of multiple availability/demand scenarios for
renewable resource availability. This solution approach brings
two major advances. Firstly, it resolves the problem that
2greater network congestion is encountered in comparison to
security-constrained cost minimisation, while still ensuring
convergence of the OPF algorithm. Secondly, it provides a
means of searching for multiple locally optimal solutions to
the OPF model, while retaining the great efficiency benefits
arising from the use of warm starts in classical optimisation
algorithms.
II. OPTIMISATION MODEL
The OPF model for generation capacity assessment without
security constraints is discussed in detail in [1]. The math-
ematical structure of the constraints is very similar to more
familiar OPF application of cost minimisation. The principal
difference lies in the objective, which is to the total generation
capacity in the network:
max
∑
n∈N
pn, (1)
where N is the set of possible locations for new generation,
and pn is the MW generation capacity allocated to site
n; if generation exceeds local demand, then the excess is
exported to an external network. Using a continuous variable
for generation capacity at each site is appropriate for a variety
of distributed sources, where individual generator unit ratings
might only be a few MW. This formulation implicitly assumes
firm connections. At distribution level this correctly models the
common situation in which the network operator is unable to
dispatch generation. At transmission level, where generation
may be constrained at cost to the system, this model will show
the absolute potential of network sections for new generation1.
Modifying this formulation to perform a cost benefit analysis
including the cost of existing generation, a simple network
upgrade model [5], and possibly the cost of additional in-
terconnection to other networks, is relatively straightforward;
the solution technique, which is the main point of this paper,
would be unchanged. As discussed in Section III, the degree
of congestion in generation maximisation is higher than in the
cost minimisation; as a consequence, even if there are other
terms present, rewarding increased generating capacity in the
objective function requires a modified solution approach.
The control variables in the optimisation model are the
new generator capacities, which are the engineering decisions
made by the model. The other decision variables in the
optimisation problem are state variables. Further features such
as VAr sources and tap changing transformers may be included
using standard power flow equations [10] without changing
the solution technique. The intact-network constraints are
standard power flow equations, apart from the presence of
new generators; these add an extra power injection term in
the Kirchhoff current law constraints.
For the security model, constraints are added to represent
the power flow equations for each contingency (i.e. circuit
outage) considered. The reference bus is located at an exter-
nal connection. In the intact network power flow equations,
1In a complete transmission system, where substantial exports are not
possible, generation and load must be balanced at all times; in this case an
assessment of potential for new generation is not relevant without market
considerations.
all external connections are equivalent (in the non-security-
constrained OPF, the only special feature of the reference bus
is its role as the reference for voltage phase; the voltage levels
at all external connections, along with the voltage phase at
connections other than the reference bus, are decision vari-
ables.) The reference bus is the slack bus in the contingency
power flow equations, in which it is a (V, δ) bus. Any other
external connections are modelled as (P,Q) buses in the
contingency flows. Where there is just one external connection,
this may still have multiple circuits for security purposes, but
the detail of these connections is not modelled.
New generation and load buses are also modelled as (P,Q)
nodes, while any existing voltage-controlling generators are
(P, V ) nodes. The new generators are run in constant power
factor mode, as is common with distributed generation [11],
with the power factors of all the new generators equal. It
is reasonably straightforward to use voltage or other control
modes instead [12]. Thermal, voltage and generation level
constraints are included to ensure that the power flow remains
feasible post-contingency; the emergency (post-contingency)
voltage and flow limits may differ from their pre-contingency
values. Post-contingency ramp rates are not explicitly taken
into account in the contingency constraints, but the time
required for system restoration will partly determine how much
the emergency limits can be relaxed from the normal state
ones.
A full mathematical formulation of the optimisation model
is given in the Appendix.
III. SCOPF SOLUTION METHOD
A. Previous approaches
In a secure DC OPF, the linearity of the problem allows
individual contingency flow constraints to be included, without
having to add the entire set of contingency power flow
constraints. In the nonlinear AC OPF, however, limiting the
post-contingency flow on one line when another suffers an
outage requires the inclusion of the entire post-contingency
power flow. Many approaches to the solution of large-scale
AC SCOPFs have therefore involved the pre-selection of a
small number of the most significant contingencies. Examples
include [13], where the two most important contingencies in
a very large system are chosen manually, and [14], where a
sophisticated automatic selection is performed.
The methodology presented here develops that of Alsac
and Stott [8] to solve the generation maximisation problem
efficiently. They used an iterative process where first the non-
secure OPF is solved, and then all contingencies in which
power flow constraint violations occur are added to the security
model. The resulting SCOPF is then solved, and the process
repeated until no violations are found.
As mentioned earlier, in generation maximisation the level
of congestion is much greater, because generation is limited
only by the network constraints rather than by demand. As
a result, when the base case OPF is solved many (indeed
possibly all) of the contingencies will show network constraint
violations; using the original Alsac-Stott algorithm developed
for cost minimisation, these would all be added to the OPF
3model. Direct solution of the resulting large optimisation
models requires substantial computer time.
This paper shows that great computational benefits can be
obtained, while still guaranteeing convergence of the algo-
rithm, by limiting the number of contingencies added at each
stage (and hence size of the OPF models solved). It will also
be seen that, where this is necessary, it is possible to search
efficiently for multiple local solutions by varying this limit on
contingencies.
A related approach to solving SCOPF problems has been
proposed independently [15], and applied to cost minimisation.
As demonstrated for the first time here, this class of approach
is of particular importance in applications such as generation
maximisation where flows are not limited by nodal demands.
Moreover, it will be shown that the varying the limit on
contingencies added provides a highly efficient means of
searching multiple local optima of the nonlinear optimisation
problem; where warm starts are critical to the efficiency of a
solution method, a simple multiple-start approach may be very
time-consuming.
B. Solution methodology
The proposed solution method for the SCOPF is as follows
(see also Fig. 1). M is the set of all contingencies considered,
M sm is the set of contingencies explicitly included in the
SCOPF, M+(−) the contingencies to be added to (removed
from) M sm, and Mnr the contingencies which have never been
removed from M sm.
1) Initialise the security model with M sm = ∅ (no contin-
gencies initially in security model). Initialise Mnr =M
(no contingencies yet removed from security model).
2) Solve SCOPF with contingencies M sm. For contingen-
cies which were included in the previous SCOPF, warm
start the contingency variables from their values in the
previous solution. For contingencies not in the previous
OPF, warm start the contingency variables from the
previous base case solution.
3) Define M− to be all contingencies in M sm ∩ Mnr
with no active voltage, reactive power or flow limit
constraints.
4) Run contingency load flows for all contingencies in M \
M sm, i.e. those not considered in the SCOPF.
• If more than n+ contingencies give constraint vi-
olations, define the set M+ to be the n+ contin-
gencies whose load flows give the most constraint
violations.
• Otherwise, define M+ to be all contingencies giving
constraint violations.
5) Terminate algorithm if no constraints are violated in
these load flows.
6) Update the list of contingencies in the SCOPF, M sm:
• Add the contingencies in M+ to the SCOPF, i.e. in
set notation update M sm =M sm ∪M+.
• Remove the contingencies in M− from the SCOPF,
and also from Mnr = M (the set of contingen-
cies which have never been removed), i.e. update
M sm =M sm \M− and Mnr =Mnr \M−.
Yes
No
No
1. Initialise with no contingencies 
in security model
2. Solve SCOPF with warm start 
from previous solution
3. Select contingencies with no 
active constraints for removal 
from SCOPF
4. Run load flows to select up to 
n
+
 contingencies with most 
constraint violations for addition 
to SCOPF
Are there constraint 
violations in the load 
flow results?
5. Algorithm
terminates
6. Add new 
contingencies to 
SCOPF model
Fig. 1. Solution algorithm for the security constrained optimal power flow.
7) Go to step 2.
Any constraint violations detected in load flow runs (i.e. in
contingencies not included in the most recent SCOPF model)
will be eliminated in subsequent SCOPF solutions, which
explicitly consider greater numbers of contingencies. When
the algorithm terminates, it does so at a local minimum of the
SCOPF including warm starting from all contingencies, not
just those explicitly included in the security model M sm.
This algorithm includes three augmentations beyond the
simplest possible implementation of Alsac and Stott’s ap-
proach:
1) Warm starting from the previous solution: It is to be ex-
pected that appropriate warm starts will accelerate the solution.
Here, the intact network variables from the previous SCOPF
solution are used as the starting values of new contingency
variables. Using the previous contingency variables (for the
contingencies in the previous solver run) for the warm start
requires slightly more complex coding and gave no consistent
benefit in run time.
2) Limit on the number of contingencies added: The Alsac-
Stott method may add a very large number of contingencies to
the security model on the first iteration. Moreover, explicitly
including the most severe contingencies in the security model
may also eliminate violations in other contingencies which are
not explicitly considered (the former are sometimes known as
umbrella contingencies [16].) It is therefore more efficient to
limit the number of contingencies added on each iteration to
the worst n+ in terms of constraint violations.
3) Removal of contingencies from the security model:
The removal of contingencies in Step 6 attempts to identify
those whose explicit consideration is unnecessary; this takes
the idea behind restricting the number added a step further.
The size of the OPFs solved is thereby reduced, leading to a
corresponding reduction in the time taken per OPF solution.
The restriction that a contingency may only be removed
once from the security model is necessary to ensure eventual
termination of the algorithm, as eventually all contingencies
4must be added if termination has not occurred. This prevents
the algorithm from cycling, alternately adding and removing
the same contingency. However, for the test cases run here,
the benefit in time per OPF solution is more than cancelled
out by the requirement for a greater number of OPF runs. De-
tailed results including contingency removal are therefore not
presented in this paper; it would be interesting to investigate
whether contingency removal is beneficial on other networks
or classes of problem.
C. Implementation
The model is coded in the AIMMS optimisation modelling
environment [17]. In addition to OPF models, AIMMS can
also be used to run the necessary load flow problems2 Use of
a modelling language reduces development times because the
model structure may be specified as on paper, with the data
being stored separately. AIMMS then generates the specific
instance of the optimisation problem from the model structure
and data, and passes it to the solver, also providing automatic
generation of first and second derivatives of the constraint
functions when required.
AIMMS may be linked to a selection of efficient commer-
cial solvers; here, the CONOPT generalised reduced gradient
solver [17] is used. With default settings, it proved to be
competitive with the KNITRO interior point solver [17] in
terms of speed, and was absolutely reliable in convergence for
the SCOPFs in this paper. While KNITRO was slightly faster
than CONOPT when it did converge, using standard settings
it frequently failed to do so when the number of contingencies
included exceeded low single figures. Both solvers are able to
handle large numbers of hard nonlinear equality and inequality
constraints automatically and exactly.
Occasionally, load flows did fail to converge in CONOPT
on early iterations of the algorithm. However, as long as
these do not occur later on, this does not risk the method
terminating unsuccessfully. It is likely that if the load flows
were implemented using specialised code they would be faster
and more robust, but this would be at the expense of greatly
increased development time.
IV. CASE STUDY
A. Test problem
To demonstrate the solution method, a modified version of
the IEEE 73-bus Reliability Test System (RTS) is used. It
consists of three identical 24-bus networks and interconnec-
tions between them. The RTS layout is shown schematically
in Fig. 2, along with a more detailed plan of Area 1. It is not
intended to be representative of any particular power system,
but it provides a convenient, reasonably large-scale heavily
meshed network on which to demonstrate the SCOPF solution
method. This test problem shows the method’s efficiency on
large problems with many line outage contingencies, but the
method is generic across different voltage levels and security
models.
2this This is achieved by formulating an optimisation problems with a
constant objective function. The optimisation solver then looks for feasibility
alone, and acts as a nonlinear equation solver.
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Fig. 2. Lower panel: schematic representation of the IEEE 73-bus reliability
test system including interconnections; each of the three identical areas
contains 24 buses. Upper panel: area 1 of the RTS; dashed lines to X’s indicate
connections to external connections, dot-dashed lines indicate connections
to other areas of the RTS, and new generator sites are marked with the
conventional generator symbol.
A total of 15 new generation units are allowed to be
connected at buses 1, 2, 7, 15 and 22 in each area of the
RTS. The line characteristics of the RTS remain the same but
the original demand specified was halved (to 4.22 GW) to
ensure a feasible problem. For field applications, the algorithm
would typically be run for the ‘worst case’ scenario, which
for an exporting network would be maximum generation and
minimum load.
105 contingencies are considered in the assessment in-
cluding all single-line outages except lines 10, 11, 16, 17
and 23 in each area. Including any of these would leave an
infeasible problem; lines 211 and 311 are single circuit radial
connections.
In order to demonstrate the flexibility of the proposed
method, calculations are performed with either one or four
external interconnections, and one or three existing voltage-
controlled generators in each area of the RTS (these are not
the same as the generators in the original RTS specification;
only the original layout and line properties are used.) The four
cases are described in Table I. All external interconnections are
modelled as having unlimited capacity (with finite capacities
the solution technique would be unchanged) and the reference
bus is always located at bus 325. In the cases with three
existing voltage-controlling generators, each has real power
output of 800 MW and reactive power limits of ±400 MVAr;
5TABLE I
EXTERNAL INTERCONNECTIONS AND EXISTING GENERATOR LOCATIONS
FOR THE FOUR NETWORK CASES. SxGy DENOTES THE CASE WITH x
EXTERNAL CONNECTIONS AND y EXISTING GENERATORS.
Case Interconnections Existing Generators
s4g3 325,123,223,323 118,218,318
s1g3 325 118,218,318
s4g9 325,123,223,323 113,115,118,213,215
218,313,315,318
s1g9 325 113,115,118,213,215
218,313,315,318
TABLE II
LOCALLY OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE FOUR NETWORK CASES (*
INDICATES THAT MULTIPLE LOCALLY OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS WERE FOUND
IN THESE CASES – SEE FIG. 3)
Optimal capacity (GW)
Case Non-secure Secure
s4g3 4.578 3.080
s1g3 3.094 2.595
s4g9 5.173 2.901*
s1g9 3.008 2.521*
where there are nine generators, each has real power output
of 200 MW and reactive capability of ±100 MVAr.
B. Results
The OPF model was run for each case, both with and with-
out security constraints. The optimal new generation capacities
available in the network are shown in Table II.
The results without security constraints show that for the
two cases with a single interconnection, the connectable
capacities are very similar. There is slightly more capacity
available where there is a greater number of voltage controlling
existing generators; it appears that despite a larger existing
generating capacity (s1g3: 2400 MW; s1g9: 1800 MW) the
greater overall reactive capability in s1g3 allows slightly more
(86 MW) new generation to connect. The two cases with 4
export connections have greater connectable capacities, as the
particular constraints affecting bus 325 are less important. The
available capacity differs much more between these cases; this
is explained by the difference in existing generating capacity
(∼600 MW).
As expected, in all cases there are distinct reductions in
capacity when the security constraints are applied. These re-
ductions range from 16% for the two cases with a single export
connection (s1g3 and s1g9) up to 43% for case s4g9. Again
there is a pattern in the capacities. The single connection cases
each show secure capacities of around 2.5 GW. The multi-
connection cases now show fairly similar secure capacities,
and hence different reductions relative to non-secure condi-
tions. The difference in existing generating capacity appears
to play little part in these cases under secure conditions. The
reason for this differing behaviour between the non-secure and
secure cases is not clear; this issue demonstrates one benefit
of using mathematical tools to analyse complex nonlinear
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Fig. 3. Locally optimal solutions found for the cases with 9 existing
generators.
problems, where a more heuristic approach might not be able
to account for all relevant phenomena.
Although the results are entirely repeatable between runs,
not all runs find precisely the same optimal capacity. As Fig. 3
shows, the cases with 9 existing generators, and particularly
multiple network interconnections, have multiple locally op-
timal solutions depending on the number of contingencies
added.
For the cases with just one existing generator in each area,
just one locally optimal solution is found; however, for cases
s1g9 and s4g9 multiple locally optimal solutions were found
depending on the limit on contingencies added, as shown
in Fig. 3. It would appear that when there is more than
one voltage-controlled generator which produces or consumes
reactive power in each area, and particularly when there are
also four external connections through which power may be
exported, the greater flexibility in the system results in these
multiple locally optimal solutions. The difference in capacity
between different locally optimal solutions is fairly small: for
the single connection case the worst solution differs from the
best by around 1.4%, while for the multi-connection case the
worst solution is around 5% below the best.
It is also informative to examine capacities at individual
locations (the layout of Area 1 of the RTS is shown in
Fig. 2.) Fig. 4 shows the individual site capacities with and
without security constraints applied for s4g3. It is immediately
apparent that in most cases, when N-1 security is introduced,
the capacities do not scale equally. For instance, the capacity
at bus 322 decreases by 63%, while that at bus 122 barely
changes. Most of the generation is sited at buses 15 and 22
in each area of the reliability test system, which are those
closest to the external connections. Where there are significant
differences between the three areas of the RTS, this is partly
explained by the pattern of interconnections between areas.
For example:
• When security constraints are imposed, considerable gen-
eration capacity transfers from bus 102 to 107. Bus 107
has an interconnection to Area 2, so it appears to be a
robust site for generation under N-1 security. Buses 207
and 307 do not have a similar interconnection, and no
similar transfer of capacity is seen in Areas 2 and 3.
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Fig. 4. Optimal generation site capacities with and without security
constraints for case s4g3.
• The main loss of capacity between the non-secure and
secure models is at buses 115, 222 and 322. Unlike
bus 115, the ‘equivalent’ buses 215 and 315 are near
interconnections to Areas 1 and 2 respectively, making
them robust sites under security constraints. Similarly, bus
122 is near the interconnection from 121 to 325, whereas
there is no similar interconnection near 222 or 322.
Once more, the finer detail of the results is determined by
the subtle interplay between the various voltage and thermal
constraints in the SCOPF model.
C. Performance of algorithm
This section compares the performance of the algorithm
with more conventional approaches. As timings of runs in
AIMMS (running under Windows XP with an Intel 2.13 GHz
dual core processor and 2GB of RAM) varied slightly from
run to run, the times given are the smallest of three runs, to
reflect most accurately the actual processor time used3. The
calculation results were repeatable between runs. The memory
usage for the very largest models was around 550 MB; this is
smaller than the physical memory of any modern PC.
Fig. 5 shows the solution times for cases s1g3 and s4g9,
plotted against the maximum number of contingencies added
per iteration n+. The shortest times were around 50 s and 100
s respectively. For comparison, direct solutions of the various
cases were performed using flat starts (i.e. all variables initially
zero except the voltage levels, which were set to 1 p.u.). The
resulting mathematical programs had around 100,000 variables
and constraints. In cases s4g3 and s1g3, for which only one
locally optimal solution was found, the solution found by this
direct method was the same as that found by the approach
presented in this paper; this demonstrates the validity of the
new method. For case s4g3, the direct solution with flat starts
took around 11300 s; direct solution warm-starting from the
base case (without security constraints) OPF solution reduced
execution time to 513 s.
The effectiveness of the enhanced features of the algorithm
described in Section III-B is discussed in the next paragraphs.
3For the three runs the actual calculations performed were identical.
However, the time taken for completion could vary substantially between runs
because of other active processes on the PC.
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Fig. 5. Time taken to solve to local optimality for network cases s1g3 and
s4g9, for a range of limits on contingencies added. The other two cases gave
similar plots.
1) Warm starts: As expected, using warm starts accelerates
convergence of the algorithm. Run times using flat starts are
not plotted, as in all calculations performed they were at least
three times greater than the warm start run times.
2) Limit on the number of contingencies added: As seen in
Fig. 5, the smallest run times occur when the limit n+ on the
number of contingencies added is between about 5 and 20.
With no limit on the number of lines added at each stage, the
run times were 194 s without removal and 240 s with removal
for network case s4g3 (33 contingencies are then added on
the first iteration.) In the other cases, without the n+ limit
almost all of the contingencies are added in the first stage,
and the algorithm then terminates as there are no violations
in the remaining contingencies. The run times are then 458
s (case s1g3), 908 s (s4g9) and 550 s (s1g9). By comparison
with Fig. 5, it is clear that imposing the limit on contingencies
added is beneficial in all cases.
The total time taken is a trade-off between the time for
each OPF solution (smaller at low n+ due to both the smaller
optimisation problems and the better warm starts) and the
number of iterations (which as expected is smaller at large
n+). With the best times for this network occurring for n+ of
between 5 and 20, the lower end of this range is probably
a good starting point for single runs on other problems.
Choosing too big a value for n+ carries a risk of large, hard
mathematical programs being encountered; adding fewer than
five contingencies is likely to result in long run times due to
the increased number of iterations.
V. DISCUSSION
The method offers an efficient means of determining the
network capacity available for generation connection, for a
given network configuration and loading condition, and with
consideration of security constraints. It would also provide
an effective means of assessing single sites as it offers an
automated means of determining whether a proposed con-
nection exceeds the capacity of the network without the
need for extensive manual examination of multiple scenarios.
Furthermore, as demonstrated in [1], there is also the option
to use it to examine the impact of planning or connection
decisions on future network capacity.
7In a monopoly utility, this approach could be used directly
in decisions on generator locations. In a liberalised market,
where ownership of the network and generators are separate,
it could find application within the process of determining use-
of-system charges; within such a framework, the method could
indicate good and bad places for generators to connect.
The structure of the method is such that it can be used
not only in the large meshed network shown here but also
where a distribution network is run in radial mode but security
of supply is maintained using network reconfiguration. The
method assumes that generation capacity is firm, but reliability
and variability of generators could be taken into account using
capacity factors such as those defined by the UK’s Energy
Networks Association [18]. Further work is planned on both
of these aspects.
The method can also be used for other contingency types,
such as generator trips and network reconfiguration. One key
point is whether a very high proportion of contingencies in
any one category restricts the optimal solution; if this is the
case, it might be most efficient to force their addition to the
model early on in the solution process.
In addition to the substantial efficiency benefits it brings
for a single run, the ability to vary the limit on contingencies
added can bring greater benefits still in problems with multiple
local solutions. The solution found using the ‘sequential warm
start’ method is necessarily a local solution of the SCOPF
including all contingencies. However, due to the non-convexity
of the AC OPF there is no way of proving that the global
solution has been found [19], even when runs of the algorithm
with different n+ have produced just one solution (although
it is likely that the single solution is then the global one).
For large non-convex nonlinear optimisation models such
as this, there are no efficient general purpose global solution
methods available. In practice therefore, it is typically best
to perform multiple runs of the same problem with different
starting points. In a sense, this has already been done by
using different values of n+. For network case s4g9, where
several different local minima were found, the best and most
common solution is probably the global optimum. If multiple
starts of the same process are required, this is complicated by
the criticality of warm starts to the efficiency of the algorithm
(possibly rendering impractical the simplest option of choosing
random starts with initial values for variables chosen from their
whole range). The ability to choose different n+ in the same
algorithm therefore provides a simple means of performing
multiple starts, which also resolves the issue of which n+
gives the quickest run time and best solution for an unseen
problem. This benefit would apply in any SCOPF problem,
and not just generation maximisation ones with an enhanced
degree of network congestion.
In a distribution network, it is relatively unlikely that
very extensive meshing, or significant numbers of voltage-
controlling generators or interconnections will be encountered.
It appears more likely then that a single local optimum will
be found. In any case, in many planning applications, it is
not absolutely necessary to know for certain that the best
local optimum found is the global optimum; a technique
is valuable if it finds a solution which is better than those
obtained by other means, and any good local optimum may
therefore suffice. This might not be the case however where
an AC OPF is given statutory authority, e.g. if it is used for
generator dispatch in a pool system.
A similar issue arises where two different local solutions
have similar objective function values. In this case, the differ-
ence in solution quality may well be within the approximation
error in the model formulation, while the optimal values of
decision variables are very different. This situation has indeed
been seen in the more complex network cases run on the RTS.
For instance in case s4g9, when the limit on contingencies
added (n+) changes from 8 to 9 the locally optimal objective
changes by 0.63%; however, the average change in optimal
generator capacities in Area 1 is then 13.3%. Once more, if
different local solutions would influence contractual decisions,
then this is a particular cause for concern. On the other hand,
under some circumstances it might be regarded as beneficial
to have a range of good locally optimal solutions with similar
objective function values, with a final decision being made on
other grounds; where multiple local optima exist, this method
provides a way of finding these multiple options.
All results here are based on the CONOPT 3.14A solver; it
is possible that that contingency removal may still prove useful
when working with other solution techniques (e.g. interior
point) or indeed on other networks. If a different solver is to
be used, it must be remembered that while they can be highly
efficient, interior point methods are generally so not well-
suited to warm starts [20] as CONOPT’s Generalised Reduced
Gradient method. As demonstrated here, complications arising
from the presence of large numbers of nonlinear equality
constraints are expected to be due to multiple local solutions,
rather than any features of the solution method such as warm
starting.
This work is currently being extended to problems involving
non-firm access with generation curtailment, and multi-period
calculations including consideration of variability of renewable
resources [21]. In such applications, the number of scenarios
considered grows exponentially with the number of renewable
resource profiles. Direct solutions on realistic network models
could therefore involve extremely large optimisation problems,
and the benefit from the method presented here is therefore
expected to be considerable.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a method for determining the capac-
ity of a network to accommodate generation under security
constraints, making use of an optimal power flow model
designed to maximise generation capacities. The maximisation
of capacity, as opposed to cost-minimisation, brings about
greater levels of congestion as power transfers in the network
are not limited by fixed demand. For this application, therefore,
specialised solution approaches are especially valuable.
The model is solved by gradually adding limited numbers of
line outage contingencies to the model, until a solution to the
full problem, including all contingencies, is obtained. The limit
on the number of contingencies added is key to the efficiency
of the method, as it reduces both the size of the optimisation
8problems encountered and the difference between successive
problems. Moreover, varying the limit on contingencies added
provides a highly efficient way of searching for multiple lo-
cally optimal solutions of the nonlinear optimisation problem.
The method has been tested on a modified version of
the highly-meshed IEEE Reliability Test System with N–1
security. When security constraints are imposed, there is a
large reduction in the network’s capacity for new generation
which emphasises the importance of considering all rele-
vant physical and operational constraints in assessments. The
method is generic and may be applied at any voltage level, for
other security models, and for similarly-structured problems
including the analysis of multiple scenarios for renewable
resource availability.
APPENDIX
OPF FORMULATION
A complete specification of the SCOPF model is given here.
A. Nomenclature
1) Base case OPF:
Sets
B Set of buses (indexed by b)
L Set of lines (indexed by l)
G Set of existing generators (indexed by g)
N Set of new generators (indexed by n)
X Set of external sources (indexed by x)
Gb Set of generators connected to bus b
Parameters
d
(P,Q)
b (P,Q) demand at bus b
V
(+,−)
b (max/min) voltage at b
b0 Reference bus
(p, q)(+,−)g (max/min) (P,Q) output of existing generator g
βg Location of g etc.
p
(+,−)
n (max/min) capacity of new generator n
φ Power angle of new generators
f+l Maximum MVA (S) flow on line l
Variables
(Vb, δb) Voltage (level,phase) at b
(p, q)g (P,Q) output of g
pn Real power capacity of n
(p, q)Xx (P,Q) supplied by x
f
(1,2),(P,Q)
l (P,Q) injection onto l at (start,end) bus
2) Security model:
Sets
M Set of contingencies (indexed by m)
Lm Set of lines available in contingency m
Parameters
V
C,(+,−)
b (max/min) voltage at b in contingency flows
χ Increase in maximum flows post-contingency
Variables
Vm,b Voltage at b in contingency m
etc.
B. OPF without security constraints
1) Objective function: The goal is to maximise the total
capacity of the new generators,
max
∑
n∈N
pn (2)
2) Capacity constraint for new generators:
p−n ≤ pn ≤ p+n ∀ n ∈ N (3)
3) Generation level constraint for existing generators:
(p, q)−g ≤ (p, q)g ≤ (p, q)+g ∀ g ∈ G (4)
4) Supply level constraint for external sources:
(p, q)X,−x ≤ (p, q)Xx ≤ (p, q)X,+x ∀ x ∈ X (5)
5) Voltage level constraint:
V −b ≤ Vb ≤ V +b ∀ b ∈ B (6)
6) Reference bus: Voltage angle is zero,
δb0 = 0 (7)
7) Kirchhoff current law: ∀ b ∈ B,∑
l∈L
pLb + d
P
b =
∑
g∈Gb
pg +
∑
x∈Xb
pXx +
∑
n∈Nb
pn (8)∑
l∈L
qLb + d
Q
b =
∑
g∈Gb
qg +
∑
x∈Xb
qXx +
∑
n∈Nb
(tanφ)pn(9)
Here, (p, q)Lb is total power injection onto lines at b. The
reactive power line injections include the shunt capacitance
term.
8) Kirchhoff voltage law (KVL):
f
(1,2),(P,Q)
l = f
KVL(P,Q)
l,(1,2) (V, δ) ∀ l ∈ L (10)
Here, fKVLPl,(1,2) (V, δ) and f
KVLQ
l,(1,2) (V, δ) are the standard Kirch-
hoff voltage law expressions for the power injections onto lines
at the two terminal buses (denoted 1 and 2).
9) Flow constraints at each end of lines:(
f
(1,2),P
l
)2
+
(
f
(1,2),Q
l
)2
≤ (f+l )2 ∀ l ∈ L (11)
C. Security model
The following constraints are added for all contingencies
explicitly included in the security model, i.e. ∀ m ∈M sm.
1) Supply level constraint for external connections:
(p, q)X,−x ≤ (p, q)Xm,x ≤ (p, q)X,+x ∀ x ∈ X \ {b0} (12)
2) Voltage level constraint:
V C,−b ≤ Vm,b ≤ V C,+b ∀ b ∈ B (13)
3) Reference bus constraints:
δm,b0 = 0 (14)
Vm,b0 = Vb0 (15)
The Reference bus is a (V, δ) bus in the contingency flows.
94) Existing voltage-controlled generator constraints:
Vm,βg = Vβg
q−g ≤ qm,g ≤ q+g
}
∀ g ∈ G (16)
5) Kirchhoff voltage law: Constraints take exactly the same
form as (10), but for contingency m, a constraint express-
ing the power injections f (1,2)m,l in terms of the contingency
voltages (Vm,b, δm,b) is only generated for the available lines
l ∈ Lm. Vm,b = 0 for lines not in Lm.
6) Kirchhoff current law: ∀ b ∈ B,∑
l∈L
pLm,b + d
P
b =
∑
g∈Gb
pg +
∑
x∈Xb
pXm,x +
∑
n∈Nb
pn (17)∑
l∈L
qLm,b + d
Q
b =
∑
g∈Gb
qm,g +
∑
x∈Xb
qXm,x
+
∑
n∈Nb
(tanφ)pn (18)
7) Flow constraints.: The contingency flow limit may be
raised above the base case by a factor χ.(
f
(1,2),P
m,l
)2
+
(
f
(1,2),Q
m,l
)2
≤ (χf+l )2 ∀ l ∈ L (19)
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